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1 INTRODUCTION
We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and
this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in
perception.1 Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its
source in perception alone (Hume, 1978, I.4.ii). Evans offers a proposal about how to understand
theway inwhich its objects’ existence unperceivedmay indeed be an aspect of our perception that
has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objec-
tivity (Evans, 1985). I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that
Evans’s proposalmay be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections
before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its
key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties
that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of for-
mal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any
experience.2
2 THE QUESTION ANDHUME’S OBJECTION
My intuitive starting point is the idea that the subjective nature of our perceptual experience intel-
ligibly explains our belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects.
This already comes with baggage. I intend to leave the subjective nature of perceptual experi-
ence as open as possible and the idea of intelligible explanation of belief by experience equally
as a placeholder to be elaborated by the various explanations that I consider below of this open-
ing intuition.3 The basic idea is that the way things are for us as perceivers somehow explains our
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belief that the objects that we perceive continue to exist beyond our perception of them. The ques-
tion that shapes the remaining discussion is how exactly we should understand this explanation.
Hume objects that no such explanation could possibly be given (1978, I.4.ii). The argument is
contained in the following two sentences.
To begin with the SENSES, ‘tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to
the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to
the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue
to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation. (Hume, 1978, p. 188)
In my terms, its form is this.
1. The only way that perception could intelligibly explain our belief in the continued exis-
tence of its objects unperceived would be for us to continue to perceive them whilst they
are not being perceived.
2. Perceiving something whilst it is not being perceived is a contradiction in terms, and so
impossible.
3. Therefore perception cannot intelligibly explain our belief in the continued existence of
its objects unperceived.
Premise 1 is based upon the following principle.
(P) The only belief in the existence of its objects thatmay be intelligibly explained by perception
is in their existence whilst being perceived.
The views that I consider belowall reject (P), but the reasoning behind it is something like this. The
objects of perception are the things that are presented in perceptual experience; and such experi-
ence is the simple, unstructured presentation to the mind of those objects. This only constitutes a
basis for the intelligible explanation of belief in the existence of specific such objects whilst they
are present in experience. That is to say, perceptual experience constitutes such a basis only whilst
the objects in question are present in it. Furthermore, their simple, unstructured presentation in
experience constitutes a basis for the explanation of belief only in the existence of such objects
whilst it they are so presented. That is to say, the existence in which such experience constitutes
a basis for the intelligible explanation of belief is only their existence whilst they are being per-
ceived. Hence (P): the only belief in the existence of its objects that may be intelligibly explained
by perception is in their existence whilst being perceived.
(P) entails that the onlyway that perception could intelligibly explain our belief in the continued
existence of its objects unperceived would be for us to continue to perceive them whilst they are
not being perceived, the first premise of theHume’s argument as set out above. Premise 2 is clearly
true; and the argument is valid. So Hume’s case that perception cannot be the source of our belief
that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived rests entirely on
principle (P).
I now turn to a proposal by Evans (1985) as to how the reasoning behind (P), hence Hume’s objec-
tion to my intuitive starting point, may be blocked.
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3 EVANS’S PROPOSAL
Contrast Hume’s scepticism with the following passage from Evans’s discussion of Strawson’s
(1959, ch. 2) exploration of the relation between the objectivity and the spatiality of our thought
and experience of the physical world.
Hero [the subject of Strawson’s thought experiment chargedwithmaking sense of the
idea that the objects of his auditory perception may continue to exist unperceived]
must be able to understand the hypothesis, even if, in fact, he never believes it to be
the case, that the phenomena of which he has experience should occur unperceived.
Now, the idea of unperceived existence or rather the idea of existence now perceived,
now unperceived, is not an idea that can stand on its own, stand without any sur-
rounding theory. How is it possible that phenomena of the very same kind as those of
which he has experience should occur in the absence of any experience? Such phe-
nomena are obviously perceptible; why should they not be perceived? To answer this
question, some rudimentary theory, or form of a theory of perception is required.
This is the indispensable surrounding for the idea of existence unperceived, and so,
of existence perceived. (Evans, 1985, pp. 261–2)
In the terms of my own discussion, Evans’s proposal is that, in the presence of this indispensable
theoretical surrounding, perception of ordinary physical objects is evidently the joint upshot of
their existence and the satisfaction of further independent conditions on their perception that
may not always be satisfied, in a way that intelligibly explains our belief that such objects may
continue to exist unperceived. (P) is false. For perceptual experience is not a simple, unstructured
confrontation with such things. Perceptual experiential presentation is instead structured by a
simple theory of perception, according to which what we perceive is the joint upshot of what is
there in the world anyway and the satisfaction of further independent enabling conditions on our
perception of it that may subsequently fail to obtain.4 Thus, my current perceptual experience
constitutes a basis for the intelligible explanation of my belief in the continued existence of its
objects beyond the extent of that very experience of them. So Hume’s objection fails.
The key question about Evans’s proposal is how in detail it is to be implemented. How exactly
does a simple theory of perception structure perceptual experience of its ordinary physical objects?
4 INTELLECTUALISM
According to the Intellectualist implementation of Evans’s proposal, the subject herself must
actively employ a simple theory of perception in thinking about the relation between her per-
ceptual experience and the way things are in the world around her if her perception is to be the
intelligible source of her belief that its objects continue to exist unperceived. Evans’s writings
(1982, 1985) suggest that this is his own view.5 In what follows I argue that the viability of Intellec-
tualism depends to some extent upon the relation proposed between the subjective nature of her
perceptual experience, on the one hand, and her employment of a simple theory of perception,
on the other.6
Thus, according to Additive Intellectualism, perceivers who do and those who do not actively
employ a simple theory of perception, in otherwise identical circumstances, share perceptual
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experience with an identical subjective nature. This is a common factor between their other-
wise quite different mental lives. Nevertheless, in line with the general project of Intellectual-
ism, it is the employment of a simple theory of perception by those who do so that explains how
their perceptual experience is an intelligible source of their belief that its objects continue to exist
unperceived.
According to Transformative Intellectualism, on the other hand, certain subjects’ active
employment of a simple theory of perception transforms the subjective nature of their
perceptual experience. They and subjects who do not employ a simple theory of perception both
have perceptual experience, but this has a quite different nature in each case. Again, in line with
the Intellectualist implementation of Evans’s proposal, it is the employment of a simple theory
of perception in this way by those who do so that explains how their perceptual experience is an
intelligible source of their belief that its objects continue to exist unperceived.7
Additive Intellectualism fails to explain how the subjective nature of perceptual experience
itself intelligibly explains belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical
objects as required. For the Additive conjunct of Additive Intellectualism entails that the subject’s
active employment of a simple theory of perception is not necessary for her perceptual experience
to have the subjective nature that it has. Yet its Intellectualist conjunct entails that her employ-
ment of a simple theory of perception is necessary for the intelligible explanation of her belief
in the continued existence unperceived of the objects that she perceives by the subjective nature
of her perceptual experience. Hence Additive Intellectualism entails that the subjective nature of
her perceptual experience is not sufficient to provide an intelligible explanation of her belief in
the continued existence unperceived of its objects.
How does Transformative Intellectualism fare? Its contention is that a perceiver’s active
employment of a simple theory of perception transforms the subjective nature of her perceptual
experience in such a way that this provides an intelligible explanation of her belief in the contin-
ued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects. This also strikes me as unsuccessful,
but in a way that serves to clarify what is required by such an explanation as I understand it. The
aim is to elaborate the role of perceptual experience as the intelligible source of her belief in the
continued existence unperceived of its objects. Yet her active employment of a simple theory of
perception already presupposes that very belief. For the core of her simple theory of perception is
the idea that what she perceives at any given time is the joint upshot of what is there to be per-
ceived anyway, whether or not she is perceiving it, and her being where she is and meeting the
other enabling conditions on her perception of it. This explicitly embeds her commitment to its
continued existence unperceived. So little, if anything, remains of the intuitive idea of perception
as the intelligible source of her belief. Although it has further problems of its own, Additive Intel-
lectualism is also subject to this same objection. For it shares the idea that the active employment
of a simple theory of perception presupposing belief in the continued existence unperceived of
what she perceives is essential to the explanation of this belief by the experience to which it is
added.
It may be replied that the objection depends upon an overly demanding interpretation of the
requirement that perceptual experience should be the source of a person’s belief in the contin-
ued existence unperceived of its objects. The official requirement is just that this belief should be
intelligibly explained by the subjective nature of her perceptual experience. The Transformative
Intellectualist at least offers an account of how this requirement is supposed to be met by appeal
to the transformative structuring of her perceptual experience by the perceiver’s active employ-
ment of a simple theory of perception. It is a consequence of the account that her experience
fails to make acquisition of the belief in continued existence unperceived intelligible in a subject
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who does not already have it. For its explanation presupposes that very belief. But why should
we accept the further requirement that experience be an intelligible source of the belief in this
sense? Perhaps we should instead adapt the Wittgensteinian slogan that “Light dawns gradually
over the whole” (Wittgenstein, Anscombe, von Wright, & Paul, 1969, § 141). The status of a per-
son’s perceptual experience as an intelligible explanation of her belief in the continued existence
unperceived of its objects comes together with her active employment of a simple theory of per-
ception in thinking about the relation between her perceptual experience and the way things are
in the world around her, which in turn effectively deploys that very belief about continued exis-
tence unperceived. None of these elements is available independently of or prior to the others.
Rather, they hold each other in place as parts of a single package that the subject acquires as a
whole.
My response to this reply from the Transformative Intellectualist is explicitly to endorse the
more demanding requirement as a constraint on any adequate account of the idea that the sub-
jective nature of our perceptual experience intelligibly explains our belief in the continued exis-
tence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects. My understanding of the Humean challenge
is to provide an explanation of how it is that creatures with perceptual experience like ours, who
also have the concepts necessary to grasp the belief that its objects continue to exist unperceived,
but do not yet have that belief, may intelligibly acquire it on the basis of that very experience.
Of course, there is an artificiality in setting things up this way. First, it is no doubt unrealistic
to suppose that perceivers with experience like ours and all the concepts necessary to grasp the
belief that its objects continue to exist unperceived remain in a state of limbo, as it were, before
they actually acquire the belief in question. Second, it may well be that some at least of the con-
cepts necessary to grasp the belief that the objects of perception continue to exist unperceived are
normally acquired in the process of acquiring that very belief. Nevertheless, my proposed inter-
pretation of Hume’s challenge is supposed to clarify the conceptual and logical commitments I
take to govern the project. Transformative Intellectualism fails this challenge.
Intellectualism, both Additive and Transformative, should therefore be rejected.
5 ENACTIVISM
According to the Enactivist implementation of Evans’s proposal, the crucial contribution of a sim-
ple theory of perception to the intelligible explanation by a person’s perceptual experience of her
belief in the continued existence unperceived of its objects consists in its systematic role in the
modulation of her behaviour in response to sensory input.8 The simple theory codifies the way in
which sensory input jointly depends upon the way things are in the world around the perceiver
and her changing position and orientation in relation to them. Her natural behavioural responses
display a systematic sensitivity to this dependence. In this way, a simple theory of perception is at
work in the perceptuomotor system. Initial examples of this in action would be the ways in which
we “spontaneously crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses, or draw near to get a better
look [at something before us]” (Noë, 2004, pp. 1–-2), or peer round a door frame to keep an eye
on someone passing along a corridor going out of view. The account has two key components: (a)
perceptual sensation systematically depends upon the subject’s changing position and orientation
in relation to what is there in the world around her; (b) perceptual experience whose subjective
nature intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unperceived of its worldly objects
consists in her practical knowledge, or skilful deployment,9 of such dependence.
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Note here the crucial use of two distinct perceptual terms. The target phenomenon to be elu-
cidated is perceptual experience whose subjective nature intelligibly explains perceivers’ belief
in the continued existence of its objects unperceived. Enactivism is characterized by the claim
that possession of such experience consists in practical knowledge, or skilful deployment, of the
dependence of perceptual sensation upon what is there in the world and the subject’s changing
position and orientation in relation to it. Thus, perceptual sensation is the basic notion that the
Enactivist uses in explanatory elucidation of the source of our belief in the continued existence
unperceived of the ordinary objects that we perceive in our perceptual experience of them.
Enactivism plausibly avoids my objections to Intellectualism. First, it avoids the insufficiency
objection to Additive Intellectualism, because the proposed practical role of a simple theory of
perception in modulating the transition from sensation to behaviour is transformative of her per-
ceptual experience rather than additive to it. Second, it avoids the circularity objection to Transfor-
mative Intellectualism, because this practical role is plausibly not dependent upon the perceiver’s
explicit grasp of a simple theory of perception already embedding belief in the continued existence
unperceived of the objects that she perceives.
Still, I claim that Enactivism fails as an account of how the subjective nature of a person’s
perceptual experience intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unperceived of
its ordinary physical objects. Its contention is that such experience is constituted by her practical
knowledge, or skilful deployment, of the systematic dependence of perceptual sensation upon
what is there in the world anyway and her own position, orientation, and movement in relation
to it. The question I would like to press in evaluating it is what exactly perceptual sensation is
supposed to be as it plays this fundamental role in the proposed account.
I assume that this is not to be identified with the perceptual experience itself that is the primary
target of our investigation. Perceptual sensation is supposed to be something strictly more basic
than this, a perceiver’s practical knowledge, or skilful deployment, of whose systematic depen-
dence upon her changing position and orientation in relation to the objects in the world around
her constitutes her possession of such perceptual experience that thereby intelligibly explains her
belief in the continued existence unperceived of its worldly objects.
Is this more basic perceptual sensation itself supposed to be or involve conscious experience of
some kind on the part of the perceiving subject or it is instead the Enactivists’ term for a kind of
physical stimulation of her perceptual system that does not itself involve any kind of conscious-
ness. So far as I can see, both possibilities are available in principle. I argue in what follows that
neither is satisfactory.
Noë takes the former option. He suggests that the nature of what I call perceptual sensation,
which is laid bare in a subject without practical knowledge, or skilful deployment, of its system-
atic dependence on her changing position and orientation in relation to the objects in the world
around her producing it that constitutes full blown perceptual experience, is a kind of conscious-
ness in which such objects are only degradedly present and not easily or immediately recognized:
‘experiential blindness’, as he calls it (2004, esp. pp. 3–10). He explicitly insists that is not an
absence of consciousness. He also identifies perceptual sensation in spatial perception with the
‘perspectival appearances’ of ordinary physical objects: the appearance of their shape from the
particular point of view in question, for example, by which he means, I take it, consciousness of
“the shape of the patch needed to occlude the object on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight”
(p. 83).
Assume first, then, that perceptual sensation involves a specific modification of the perceiver’s
consciousness, and that it is supposed to be her practical knowledge, or skilful deployment, of
the way in which this depends upon her changing position and orientation in relation to the
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things around her that constitutes her possession of perceptual experience intelligibly explain-
ing her belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary objects. On this assumption
Enactivism surely fails by its own lights. The position is proposed as an elucidation of how con-
scious perceptual experience itself is the intelligible source of a perceiver’s belief in its objects’
continued existence unperceived. Yet the most basic form of perceptual consciousness, namely
perceptual sensation here, is explicitly acknowledged to do no such thing. Perceptual experience
strictly dependent upon this perceptual sensation is supposed to be such a source. But this is char-
acterized as a form of practical knowledge or skilful activity explicitly downstream of the mode
of perceptual consciousness constituted by the initial perceptual sensation, akin to a subsequent
interpretation of that sensation. Primary perceptual consciousness itself, that is to say perceptual
sensation, is absolutely not an intelligible source of the perceiver’s belief in the continued exis-
tence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects.
It may be replied that the subject’s most basic perceptual consciousness is on this view trans-
formed into a form of perceptual experience that does intelligibly explain her belief in contin-
ued existence unperceived in the sense required precisely by the subject’s practical knowledge,
or skilful deployment, of the dependence of perceptual sensation upon her changing position
and orientation in relation to its objects. But I repeat my initial question: what exactly is the
perceptual sensation supposed to be here, practical knowledge or skilful deployment of whose
systematic dependence on her changing position and orientation constitutes her possession of
such perceptual experience? It cannot be that experience itself, for the explanatory structure
of Enactivism, requires that it is strictly more basic than this; and it cannot be a more basic form
of perceptual consciousness for the reasons just given. So it can only be some kind of position-
and-orientation-dependent physical stimulation of her perceptual system not itself involving any
kind of consciousness: the second option that I distinguished above.
Now it is certainly true that worldly objects impact physically upon a perceiver in just this
way, and also that she normally shows in her engagement with the things around her a sophis-
ticated practical knowledge and skilful deployment of the ways in which such physical stimula-
tion depends on her changing position and orientation in relation to them. But as yet this story
says absolutely nothing about her conscious perceptual experience of the world. So if this form
of Enactivism is offered as an account of the intuitive datum that the subjective nature of her
perceptual experience intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unperceived of
its objects, then it depends upon a highly questionable behaviourist reduction of conscious per-
ceptual experience. The proposal would be that possession of such experience simply consists in
being disposed to behave, or actually behaving, in ways that display a suitable sensitivity to the
systematic dependence of the physical stimulation of her perceptual systems upon her changing
position and orientation in relation to the physical objects around her.
I do not regard such a behaviourist reduction as credible; and it is explicitly rejected on Noë’s
Enactivism. His idea is that perception depends on the possession and skilful exercise of practical
knowledge in the presence of conscious perceptual sensation: “This is not a behaviourist thesis”
(Noë, 2004, p. 33).10 I assume other Enactivists agree. So I find the current version of the view also
unacceptable.
I conclude that there is no defensible form of Enactivism that offers any hope of an adequate
elucidation of the way that perceptual experience intelligibly explains our belief in the continued
existence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects.
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6 SUBPERSONALISM
According to the Subpersonalist implementation of Evans’s proposal, the subjective nature of a
person’s perceptual experience intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unper-
ceived of its ordinary physical objects in virtue of the role of a simple theory of perception in the
subpersonal processing that computes its determinate personal level representational contents
from proximal sensory stimulation otherwise underdetermining its worldly causes.11 The key idea
is that such processing delivers perceptual contents that reliably represent perceptual constancies
in objects and their properties over appropriate local spatiotemporal variation in the proximal
sensory stimulation that they produce, by mirroring in the principles implicit in its transitions
the ecologically most likely regularities by which the actual environmental causes lead to the pat-
terns of stimulation in question. That is to say, we have the capacity in perception “systematically
to represent a given particular or attribute as the same despite significant differences in proximal
stimulation—despite a wide variety of perspectives on the particular or attribute” (Burge, 2010,
p, 274).
A simple example serves to illustrate the idea (see Nudds (2012)). Light arriving at the eyes
from various parts of the scene before a perceiver varies in its intensity on arrival. This variation
underdetermines certain worldly features of the scene. For it is the joint effect of both variation
in the intensity of the light incident upon the surfaces out there and variation in the proportion of
the light incident upon them that is reflected by those surfaces. Thus, to simplify the picture even
further, a reduction in the intensity of the light arriving at the eyes from two adjacent parts of the
scene, p1 and p2, may be the result of two different scenarios. First, less light is falling on p2 than
on p1, because, although both are parts of a uniformly coloured surface, p2 is in shadow and p1
is not: something else is obstructing some of light falling on p2 in a way that it does not obstruct
light falling on p1. Second, p1 and p2 are uniformly illuminated parts of distinct surfaces meeting
between p1 and p2 in the scene before the perceiver, p2 reflecting less of the light incident upon
it than p1 does, because the two surfaces are of different colours, p1 lighter than p2.
The perceptual system resolves the proximal underdetermination between these two scenarios
by exploiting a general fact about theworld thatwe perceive. Shadows on a surface tend to produce
a gradual reduction in the intensity of light falling upon it. Adjacent surfaces of different colours,
on the other hand, tend to produce a sudden reduction in the intensity of the light reflected, from
the lighter to the darker surface. Things could in principle have been quite different; and occasion-
ally they are different. So the actual reduction in the intensity of the light arriving at the eyes from
p1 and p2 underdetermines the distal scene. But the correlations between gradual intensity reduc-
tions and shadows, on the one hand, and between sudden intensity reductions and surface edges,
on the other, are reliable. The visual system exploits these in computing perceptual contents from
the sensory stimulation produced by the scene before the perceiver, determinately representing a
uniformly coloured surface partly in shadow or an edge where two differently coloured surfaces
meet, depending on whether the reduction in the intensity of light detected is gradual or sudden
respectively.
Even this simple example becomes quite complicated in any actual case, with multiple shad-
ows and edges all interacting with each other. And similar processes are nested and multiplied
in the full transition from proximal sensory stimulation to complete perceptual content. But the
basic idea that the visual system exploits contingent lawlike features of the actual environment
in resolving the underdetermination of worldly causes by sensory stimulation should neverthe-
less be clear. In this way perceptual contents are derived that reliably represent objects and their
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properties, at a time and over time, as the same or different, despite significant differences or sim-
ilarities in the proximal stimulation that they produce. The core contention of Subpersonalism in
response to Hume’s challenge is that this accounts for the way in which the subjective nature of
our perceptual experience intelligibly explains our belief in the continued existence unperceived
of its ordinary physical objects. The sophistication of the subpersonal processing producing it is
what endows our experience itself with this explanatory power.
My basic objection to Subpersonalism is that its perceptual contents representing identities or
constancies between various objects and their properties across different perspectives upon them
are simply served up from nowhere so far as the subject herself is concerned, as the contents of
her experience, in such a way that they fail to make fully intelligible from her own point of view
the continued existence unperceived of what she thereby perceives. I’ll approach this objection in
three ways.
First, the contents representing perceptual constancies produced by the subpersonal compu-
tation central to the view may for all that has been said so far be wholly unconscious. So Sub-
personalism makes no direct contact with the problem that I am concerned with here of how
the subjective nature of our perceptual intelligibly explains our belief in the continued existence
unperceived of its objects. Of course, a connection may be made by restricting attention to cases
in which the perceptual contents in question are indeed conscious. Still, the point remains that
the account on offer of how such conscious experience explains belief in the continued existence
unperceived of its objects makes no essential reference to its being conscious. This is all well and
good so far as Burge himself is concerned, who apparently takes it to be a virtue of his position
(2010, esp. pt. III). But it is inconsistent with a conviction powerfully elaborated by Eilan (2011,
2017) that the intelligible explanation of our belief in the continued existence unperceived of the
objects that we perceive is based upon the specific modification of consciousness that our percep-
tual experience is. That is to say, the explanation depends essentially upon the consciousness of
our experience in a way that Subpersonalism fails to capture.
I share Eilan’s conviction; but this formulation of the objection depends entirely on its defence
against Burge’s alternative vision. I cannot take this on here. So I turn to a second concern.
Subpersonalism explains our belief in the continued existence unperceived of what we perceive
on the basis of perceptual contents explicitly identifying certain objects and their properties across
our various experiential perspectives upon them. Regardless of their consciousness, are such con-
tents up to the task? Not obviously so, if what is involved is simply the representation of sameness
of object or property over variation in perspective within continuous perception. There is no obvi-
ously intelligible explanation of a person’s belief in an object’s continued existence unperceived
from her perceptual representation of it as uniformly coloured despite apparently differing in
darkness over its spatial extent, or as one and the same thing despite apparently differing in certain
respects over the temporal extent of her experience of it, say. These representations of identities
over variation in perspective during continuous perceptionmay provide the basis for the subject’s
inference to their best explanation by the idea that the objects in question also continue to exist
unperceived. But this is not an account of the initial datum as I understand it, that the continued
existence unperceived of the objects that we perceive is an aspect of the way that things strike us
in perception itself.12
Perhaps the representations of identity central to Subpersonalism are up to the task if the sub-
personal computations involved additionally exploit intuitive mechanical principles in producing
contents identifying an object as one and the same over breaks in its perception, due, for exam-
ple to temporary occlusion by an obstacle. This is entirely in keeping with the position (Burge,
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2010, ch. 10); and simply taken at face value, such representations plausibly directly explain the
perceiver’s belief in such objects’ continued existence unperceived.
This immediately raises my third, concern, though. On the current version of Subpersonalism,
perceptual contents are served up to consciousness by subpersonal perceptual processing as if
from nowhere, without any intelligibility as to why the perceiver should take them at face value or
what grounds their identities and constancies. Any belief in the continued existence unperceived
of the objects perceived to which such identity contents give rise is therefore not fully intelligibly
explained by the subjective nature of perceptual experience, characterised as it is simply by a blank
‘assertion’ of the relevant identities without any illumination as to their grounds or insight as to
how they might be true.
The definitive feature of Subpersonalism is that the simple theory of perception that is cru-
cial to the computation of the constancy contents of conscious perceptual experience operates
entirely subpersonally and beyond the ken of the subject herself. In a sense that comes to the fore
in section 7 below, its workings do not show up in the form of her conscious perspective on the
world, which receives only the final judgement of the subpersonal system, as it were, as to how
things are out there, as its representational content. So, even if this perceptual content suggests
that the things that she perceives may continue to exist unperceived, the subjective nature of her
perceptual experience itself gives her no understanding of how or why this is so.
There is plainly room to dispute whether such additional illumination is necessary for the intel-
ligible explanation of our belief in the continued existence unperceived of the ordinary physical
objects that we perceive by the subjective nature of our perceptual experience of them. Here, as
with themy consideration of theWittgensteinian response to the circularity objection to Transfor-
mative Intellectualism earlier, I rest content with offering this objection to Subpersonalism as an
explicit registration of my own commitment to giving an account of the source of this belief in our
perceptual experience of the world around us that does satisfy this more demanding condition on
its intelligible explanation, rather than as any refutation of Subpersonalism tout court.
7 PERCEPTUALISM
This brings me finally to the implementation of Evans’s proposal that I am inclined to endorse
myself and wish to offer here for further consideration. According to Perceptualism, the role
of a simple theory of perception in structuring perceptual experience intelligible explanatory of
belief in the continued existence unperceived of its objects consists in its essential role in a correct
metaphysics for that experience.
On the view of itsmetaphysics that I endorse (2011, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b), perceptual expe-
rience is a temporally extended point of view on what is there in the world in the relevant circum-
stances of perception. That is to say, S’s perceptual experience at a time t is her conscious acquain-
tance, from her position and orientation at t and in the particular perceptual circumstances, with
theworldly scene before her. This is not a causal explanation of her experience, but rather specifies
the metaphysical nature of her conscious perceptual condition at that time.13 Thus, a simple the-
ory of perception with enabling conditions on perception that are independent of what is there in
the world anyway andmay subsequently fail to bemet is essential to themetaphysics of conscious
perceptual experience itself.
Perceptualism is the view that this is what provides the intelligible explanation by the sub-
jective character of perceptual experience of our belief in the continued existence of its objects
unperceived. I propose it for consideration here. Of course, there is a great deal of work required
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fully to elaborate and defend Perceptualism. I end by giving some clarification of the view and
sketching some of what I take to be its virtues.
7.1
Perceptualism depends upon the significance of the metaphysics of conscious perceptual expe-
rience for which beliefs may intelligibly be explained by its subjective character. This same idea
shows up in the reasoning that I offered for principle (P) above that carries the weight of Hume’s
objection to my intuitive starting point that the subjective nature of our perceptual experience
intelligibly explains our belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical
objects. According to Hume’s metaphysics, the conscious presentation of certain objects in per-
ception consists in their simple, unstructured presence before the mind. This is what motivates
the key claim that such presentation constitutes a basis for the intelligible explanation of belief
only in the existence of such objects whilst it they are so presented.
From the perspective of Perceptualism, Hume’s impoverished metaphysics of perceptual expe-
rience counterintuitively restricts what may be intelligibly explained by its subjective character.
The correct response is to highlight the place of Evans’s proposal about the centrality of a simple
theory of perception in correcting the metaphysics of perception in such a way as to provide the
intelligible explanation of our belief in the existence unperceived of its objects that Hume fails to
find. This is precisely what Perceptualism achieves.14
It is crucial in understanding the position to recognize that the place of simple theory of per-
ception, according to which perception is a matter of what is there in the world anyway given the
satisfaction of spatial and other enabling conditions that may subsequently fail to obtain, lies in
the metaphysics of the conscious conditions that are perceptual experiences. The theory is in this
sense not the perceiver’s theory. It is the definitive claim of Perceptualism that its essential role in
a correct account of the nature of perceptual experience nevertheless shows up for the perceiver
in intelligibly explaining from her point of view as the subject of that conscious condition the
continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects.
7.2
Perceptualism places great weight on the thesis that perceptual experience is acquaintance with
particular worldly things from a point of view and in certain circumstances. In considering such
experience we are often concerned with which worldly things are presented in this way; and rea-
sonably so. This intelligibly explainsmany of the beliefs to which it gives rise, that those particular
objects are shaped and coloured thus, for example. That the experience is from such and such a
point of view and orientation in specific perceptual circumstances is equally part of its funda-
mental nature, though, regardless of what the objects of acquaintance may be on any specific
occasion from that point of view and in those circumstances. Hence the existence of perspecti-
val and other circumstantial enabling conditions on such perceptual experience, which actually
obtain but may subsequently fail to do so, is essential to the nature of perceptual consciousness
itself. What it is like for the subject in perceiving the world as she does therefore has a form that
intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unperceived of the particular worldly
objects with which it acquaints her in this way.
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7.3
Perceptualism recognizes that more is required for the intelligible explanation of her belief than
the fact that the objects of perception do indeed continue to exist unperceived. Thismust somehow
be evident in her conscious experience of them. Its distinctive contention is that the way in which
such experiencemakes this evident to the subject is quite different from theway inwhich it makes
evident to her the shapes and colours, for example, of the particular objects that she perceives.
The latter is a matter of which shapes and colours she is acquainted with in her experience. The
former—that is to say, the continued existence unperceived of those objects themselves whose
shapes and colours these are—is amatter of the way in which she is acquainted with those things.
This is equally a component of the metaphysics of that very conscious experiential condition.
7.4
Thus, the Perceptualist claims that the continued existence unperceived of the objects of percep-
tion is intelligible to the subject in a way that I argued the Subpersonalist fails to capture. For
the correct account of how it is that the objects she perceives may continue to exist unperceived
is essential to the conscious condition that she is in in perceiving them. Her experience is not
simply a brute representation of various identities across changing perspectives thrown up into
consciousness by the subpersonal perceptual processing system that therefore remain in a crucial
sense unintelligible to the perceiver.
I acknowledged in concluding the discussion of Subpersonalism above that the accusation of
a failure of intelligibility against that view is best understood as an indication of what I expect
from an adequate account of the intuitive idea that the subjective nature of our perceptual experi-
ence intelligibly explains our belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical
objects. In keeping with this understanding, the claim here that Perceptualism succeeds in cap-
turing the necessary intelligibility is likewise best understood as a clarification of what I take this
to involve: further elucidation of the very notion of intelligible explanation that figures in this
intuitive starting point.
7.5
Perceptualism may be seen as virtuously intermediate between Intellectualism and the de facto
truth of a simple theory of perception, according to which what we perceive is the joint upshot of
what is there in the world anyway and the satisfaction of further spatial and other independent
enabling conditions on our perception of it that may subsequently fail to obtain. I argued that the
former fails to vindicate the idea of perception as the source in the required sense of our belief in
the continued existence unperceived of the objects that we perceive. The latter is clearly insuffi-
cient for perception to constitute such a source in a way that is in any sense intelligible to us as
perceivers. Accordingly, Perceptualism insists that a simple theory of perception is essential to the
intrinsic characterization of perceptual consciousness yet without being employed by the subject
in explicit reflection about the relation between perceptual experience and the way things are in
the world around her. Enactivism and Subpersonalism plausibly both aim to occupy this same
middle ground, finding Intellectualism overly cognitively demanding and the de facto truth of a
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simple theory of perception insufficiently so for the intelligible explanation of belief in continued
existence unperceived. I argue above that both fail. I offer Perceptualism as a better attempt.
7.6
Finally, I return to the issue that initially prompted Evans’s proposal about the importance of
structuring perception with a simple theory of perception: the relation between objectivity and
spatiality. Perceptualism clearly gives spatiality a central role in the intelligible explanation of our
belief in the continued existence unperceived of the objects that we perceive. For the idea that a
person is acquainted with the objects in the world around her from a particular point of view is
crucial to the metaphysics of the conscious perceptual experience that provides this explanation.
Contrast this with a quite different appeal to spatiality. On this alternative, perception repre-
sents its objects, initially quite neutrally with respect to their continued existence unperceived, as
located in space; and the subject arrives at her belief in their continued existence unperceived as
the best explanation of their spatial and other behaviour over time. Call this Inferentialism. Here,
the source of the belief is her reasoning on the basis of patterns in perceptual experience that is
in its intrinsic nature neutral on the continued existence of its objects unperceived. According to
Perceptualism, on the other hand, the source of her belief in the continued existence unperceived
of the objects that she perceives lies in the subjective nature of her perceptual experience itself in
virtue of the constitutive role of a spatial simple theory of perception in the metaphysics of that
very experience.
I claim no absolute necessity for this fundamental connection between spatiality and the
objectivity of continued existence unperceived. For there may be perceptual experience equally
explanatory of belief in the continued existence unperceived of its objects in virtue of the constitu-
tive role in its metaphysics of a simple theory of perception with wholly non-spatial enabling con-
ditions.15 Nevertheless, the crucial place of spatial considerations in the intelligible explanation of
this belief on the basis of our perception is intrinsic to the subjective nature of the experience itself
according to Perceptualism in a way that it is not on the current Inferentialist alternative. My con-
tention is that only Perceptualism adequately accounts for the intuitive idea that the subjective
nature of our perceptual experience itself intelligibly explains our belief in the continued existence
unperceived of its ordinary physical objects. Inferentialism fails by the lights of the understanding
of this intuition controlling the discussion here.
8 CONCLUSION
We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and
this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in
perception. That is to say, the subjective nature of our perceptual experience intelligibly explains
our belief in the continued existence unperceived of its ordinary physical objects. Evans’s pro-
posal concerning the role of a simple theory of perception in structuring our perceptual relation
with what we perceive in the world around us is the key to countering Hume’s scepticism about
this intuitive starting point. Intellectualism, Enactivism, Subpersonalism, and indeed Inferential-
ism, all seek to implement Evans’s proposal in this context. I have offered reasons for doubting
their success and for preferring my own Perceptualism, according to which a simple theory of
perception plays a constitutive role in the metaphysics of our perceptual experience itself. In this
14 BREWER
way, Perceptualism insists, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and
properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular experience, also upon a kind of for-
mal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any
experience.16
NOTES
1 I elaborate this intuitive starting point more fully in section 2 below.
2 Much of the argument here is developed in greater detail and extent in my forthcoming book, The Objectivity of
Perception (Brewer, forthcoming).
3 The intuition has also been rejected (Mackie, 2019). I discuss this scepticism elsewhere (Brewer, forthcoming).
I assume here that such scepticism is misplaced: our belief in the continued existence of the ordinary objects
that we perceive beyond our own current experience of them is indeed intelligibly explained by the nature of
our perceptual experience of them.
4 As with the intelligible explanation of belief by experience, precisely what is involved in the structuring of per-
ceptual presentation by a simple theory of perception in this way is the subject of debate and dispute between
the various accounts that I consider below.
5 I also read Strawson (1959, 1966), McDowell (1994), and Boyle (2012, 2016) as Intellectualists.
6 The key distinction here draws directly upon Boyle’s distinction between additive and transformative concep-
tions of rationality (2016).
7 The Transformative Intellectualist faces delicate questions about how current and stable a perceiver’s active
employment of a simple theory must be to maintain the subjective character of her perceptual experience that
intelligibly explains her belief in the continued existence unperceived of its objects. But I leave these aside here.
8 Noë (2004) is the primary focus of my discussion of Enactivism. See also Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991),
Hurley (1998), Thompson and Varela (2001), O’Regan and Noë (2001a).
9 I set aside the important issue of where to locate what is required here on a continuum between some form
of practical knowledge in the absence of even the capacity for its active realization, on the one hand, and its
deployment in current behaviour, on the other. This varies between, and even within, the views of different
proponents of Enactivism.
10 See Block (2001), and O’Regan and Noë (2001b) for further debate over Enactivists’ commitment to some form
of behaviourism.
11 I focus here on the most developed version of this view from Burge (2010).
12 See sect. 7.6 below for a little more on the need and means to avoid this inferential picture of our belief in the
continued existence unperceived of what we perceive in the current context.
13 I do not seek here further to defend this metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is explicitly a disjunctivist,
relationalist formnaïve realism.Aswell as references tomy ownwork in the text, see Soteriou (2016) for excellent
discussion and bibliography. My focus instead is on its implications for the intelligible explanation of our belief
in the continued existence unperceived of the ordinary physical objects that we perceive.
14 See Strawson (1974) for a different but somewhat analogous response to Hume.
15 See again the debate between Strawson (1959, 1980) and Evans (1985) for more on this issue.
16 I am grateful to Dom Alford-Duguid, David Bain, Matt Boyle, Jessica Brown, Maria Corrado, Tom Crowther,
ImogenDickie, Naomi Eilan, Craig French, Richard Fumerton, AndreaGiananti, Anil Gomes, Hemdat Lerman,
Heather Logue, Guy Longworth, Matt McGrath, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Louise Richardson, Johannes Roessler,
Umrao Sethi, Paul Snowdon, Gianfranco Soldati, and Matt Soteriou for helpful comments on earlier versions of
this material.
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